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HOLIER THAN THOU:
ATTACKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, a small number of states have either
passed, or attempted to pass, legislation that would allow individuals
to exempt themselves from generally applicable laws that conflict
with the dictates of their religion.' The California legislature, for ex-
ample, in its 1997-98 term, passed a bill known as the "Religious
Freedom Protection Act.",2 Were it not for Governor Wilson's veto,
3
this bill would have provided a defense to any law that substantially
interfered with an individual's right to the free exercise of religion.4
Furthermore, this defense could only have been overcome if the gov-
ernment could demonstrate that the challenged law satisfied what is
known as the "strict scrutiny," or "compelling interest," test.5 Once
referred to by the United States Supreme Court as "the most de-
manding test known to constitutional law,",6 the strict scrutiny test
requires a showing that a challenged law is justified by a "compel-
ling interest," and that the law achieves this interest through the least
restrictive means available. The harshness of this test has earned it
1. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Protection Act of 1998, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 761.01-.05 (West 1998); Proposed Alabama Religious Freedom Amend-
ment, 1998 Ala. Acts 98-409; Religious Freedom Protection Act, A.B. 1617,
1997-98 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
2. A.B. 1617, 1997-98 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
3. See A.B. 1617, 1997-98 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) Veto
Message (visited Jan. 21, 1998) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
cgi-bin/postquery?billnumber-ab_1617&sess=PREV&house=B>.
4. See A.B. 1617 § 6400(b)(2) (Cal. 1997).
5. See id. § 6400(b)(1) (referring to the test as the "compelling interest"
test).
6. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
7. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984).
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the reputation of being "'strict' in theory... [yet] fatal in fact. ''8 De-
spite this reputation, however, the California legislature would have
it apply in the context of any challenge to any law that allegedly
placed a burden on an individual's religious liberty.9
Legislation similar to California's Religious Freedom Protection
Act has been successfully passed in a number of states, and still other
states continue to debate whether they should follow suit. 10 Like the
California bill, this legislation applies, or would apply, the strict
scrutiny test to any law that is shown to place a burden on the free
exercise of an individual's religion." The striking similarity of form
between the states' respective statutes is attributable to the fact that
each was patterned after Congress's ill-fated Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).1 2 RFRA was the first statute to require use
of the strict scrutiny test in the context of free exercise challenges to
generally applicable laws. Passed by Congress in 1993, the Act was
a direct response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
13
where the Court specifically declined to use the test in that context.
14
Four years after RFRA's passage, the Court struck down the Act
as an unconstitutional violation of the principles of federalism and
8. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
9. See A.B. 1617 §6400(b).
10. Compare Religious Freedom Protection Act, A.B. 1617, 1997-98 Le-
gis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), with Religious Freedom Protection Act of 1998,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 (West 1998), and Proposed Alabama Relig-
ious Freedom Amendment, 1998 Ala. Acts 98-409.
11. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Protection Act of 1998, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 761.03 (1998); Proposed Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, 1998
Ala. Acts 98-409, § V(a).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) (invalidated in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997)).
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For the proposition that RFRA was passed in re-
sponse to Smith, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (citing Smith as "virtually
eliminat[ing] the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion"). See also Free Exercise of
Religion: Hearing on A.B. 1617 Before the Assembly Comm. on the Judiciary,
1997-98 Legis., Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Hearing on A.B. 1617]
(stating that RFRA was passed in "direct response" to Smith).
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82.
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separation of powers.' As a result, those state leaders who felt that
Congress was correct in passing RFRA were forced to create relig-
ious freedom legislation of their own.
This Comment will analyze the implications of permitting indi-
vidual states to pass religious freedom legislation similar to RFRA.
Part II will focus on some of the practical considerations that counsel
against passage of such laws, and Part Il will recount the historical
development of such legislation on both the federal and state level.
Part III will also give a synopsis of some of the major arguments that
have been put forth by the legislation's proponents. Finally, Part IV
will address a specific constitutional challenge to religious freedom
legislation under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
The ultimate purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has both the ability and the desire to strike down re-
ligious freedom legislation. This desire is evidenced not only by
dicta in the controversial Smith decision but also by undercurrents in
the more recent case of City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court
struck down RFRA.16 While it may be possible to interpret Boerne
as giving the states free reign to pass religious freedom legislation of
its own (since the basis of the Boerne holding applied only to the
Federal Congress),17 this Comment will show that such a result was
*not, in fact, the Court's intention.
II. PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS
In modem America, diversity-whether it is racial, ideological,
or religious-is encouraged. According to Justice Scalia's opinion in
Smith, "'we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference,' . . . and ... we value and
protect that religious divergence."' 8
In a society as admittedly heterogeneous as our own, passage of
religious freedom legislation such as RFRA or California's Religious
Freedom Protection Act raises an important concern-namely, what
would be the scope of its effect? In other words, how many people
15. See Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
16. See id.
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (quoting Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606
(1961) (plurality opinion)).
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would claim exemption from how many laws? On a more alarming
note, how many new and heretofore unheard of "religions" would
crawl out of the woodwork to jump on the bandwagon of legal im-
munity? The answers cannot be known, but the simple fact that re-
ligious freedom legislation like RFRA is on the books causes the
imagination to spin with thoughts of the potential limitless expanses
to which it could be taken.
For example, imagine a member of a religious cult that believes
in human sacrifice. (Sure, it sounds absurd, but the founder of Jones-
town did not think it was too far outside the realm of possibilities.)
Would that member be able to claim exemption from murder laws?
The proponents of religious freedom legislation would maintain, "Of
course not-the regulation of murderers is certainly a compelling
interest that would outweigh any assertion of this so-called 'religious
freedom.' But that still would not answer the question, which is,
Would the member be able to even make the claim? If the answer to
this question is "yes," then it seems that religious freedom legislation
would certainly have unlimited applicability.
If that is the case, then what might become of some of our "less
compelling" laws? Anyone with a conscientious eye towards the
maintenance of societal order would be justifiably concerned about
the extent to which people could successfully claim legal exemptions
under religious freedom laws. After all, if they were not foreseen to
have a definable impact on the ability of individuals to practice their
religions without state interference, then why pass them? The speed
alone with which Congress passed RFRA after the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith belies any assertion that the law was not intended
to have far-reaching effects.' 9
The Supreme Court itself has expressed concern with the poten-
tial scope of religious freedom laws. 20 Also, it has pointed to other
prudential concerns that counsel against their passage, including the
inappropriateness of giving the judiciary the task of determining
what is important to a given religion.2' Each of these issues repre-
sents a valid basis for rethinking this modem legislative approach
19. Smith was decided in April of 1990. RFRA was passed only three years
later in November of 1993.
20. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
21. See id. at 886-87.
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to religious freedom jurisprudence. This Comment discusses the
Court's analysis of these factors more fully in Part 111.22
IH. HISTORY OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTS
A. The Concerns That Led to RFRA's Passage
Before Congress passed its Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
there had been an outpouring of concern from scholars and religious
groups about the ability of government to infringe upon the religious
liberty of its constituents under the guise of representing the interests
of the majority.23 According to some, the recent Supreme Court de-
cision in Smith marked the end of religious freedom.24 "Religious
minorities would be destroyed... [and] the devout would be forced
to choose between fidelity to their beliefs and bowing to Caesar. The
images were grim indeed. 25
The spark that set these concerns ablaze was a series of deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court. The first of these was
Employment Division v. Smith,26 where the Court held that the strict
scrutiny test was inappropriate in the context of religious freedom
22. In addition to the Supreme Court, some legal scholars have stated their
own concerns regarding the possible effects of religious freedom laws. See,
e.g., David L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis
of the EEOC'S Proposed Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. REV. 119, 143 (1995)
(stating that "[m]y practical concern is that those most in need of RFRA, the
adherents of the socially peripheral, marginalized, and disfavored religions and
sects, will be ground under in the secular workplace by their majoritarian re-
ligious co-workers").
23. See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes
of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 235, 235 (1998) (discuss-
ing the concerns that arose as a result of the Smith decision).
24. See id.
25. Id. (citing Janet V. Rugg & Andrea A. Simone, Comment, The Free
Exercise Clause: Employment Division v. Smith's Inexplicable Departure
from the Strict Scrutiny Standard, 6 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT 117, 141
(1990); Gregory D. Wellons, Note, Employment Division, Department of Hu-
man Resources v. Smith: The Melting of Sherbert Means a Chilling Effect on
Religion, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 149, 173 (1991); Rashelle Perry, Note, Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.: A Hallucinogenic
Treatment of the Free Exercise Clause, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 359, 376 (1991));
see also Gregory, supra note 22 (discussing the negative impact of the Smith
decision on religious harassment in the workplace).
26. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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claims. The next decision was City ofBoerne v. Flores,27 where the
Court struck down Congress's legislative attempt to reestablish the
test in that context. The reasoning behind these decisions will be the
focus of the remainder of this Part.
B. Smith
The origins of religious freedom legislation can be traced to the
Supreme Court's controversial decision in Employment Division v.
Smith.2 8 That case involved a denial of unemployment benefits to
two members of the Native American Church because of their sac-
ramental use of peyote, a controlled substance in the state of Oregon,
where the case originated.29 The defendants claimed that the denial
of benefits was an infringement of their right to the free exercise of
religion, protected by the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.30 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that individuals
cannot claim exemptions from generally applicable laws simply be-
cause the laws conflict with their religious practices. 31
Most of the Court's opinion in Smith was dedicated to explain-
ing why it would be inappropriate to use the strict scrutiny test
against generally applicable laws that burden an individual's right to
the free exercise of religion.32 The Court stated that the use of such a
burden as a proxy for a religion-neutral law's invalidity would be "a
constitutional anomaly, '33 and "would be courting anarchy, 0' 4 par-
ticularly in a society as religiously diverse as ours.35 Yet, despite the
Court's apparent conviction that the use of strict scrutiny in this
context represented a constitutional violation, the Court supported
this proposition with no explanation or citation to the Constitution
27. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
28. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29. See id. at 874.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 878-82.
32. Strict scrutiny, the Court noted, would require that a challenged law be
justified by a compelling state interest and that it be the least discriminatory
means of achieving that interest. See id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963)).
33. Id. at 886.
34. Id. at 888.
35. See id.
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whatsoever. In fact, the Court's conclusion was ultimately based
more on prudential concerns than anything else. Specifically, the
Court focused on the variety of laws that could be challenged36 on
similar free-exercise grounds and on the impracticality of charging a
court with the duty of determining which practices are truly impor-
tant to particular religions. 37 Thus, although the Court's instinct led
it to the conclusion that,for constitutional reasons, the strict scrutiny
test did not belong in the context of free exercise vindication, one
who truly searches for the constitutional underpinnings of the Smith
holding is left with only the weak foundation that the Court thought
it was a bad idea. Ultimately, after stating that the use of strict scru-
tiny would "contradict[] both constitutional tradition and common
sense," 38 the Court went on to explain itself only with regard to the
latter.
In attempting to distinguish its past use of the strict scrutiny test
in the free exercise context, the Court fared only slightly better. The
primary case relied on by the defendants to illustrate this past use
was Sherbert v. Verner.39 In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church was denied unemployment benefits after being
fired from her job for refusing to work on Saturdays-a refusal re-
quired by her religion.40 Despite the striking similarity of facts be-
tween Sherbert and Smith, the Court in Sherbert applied strict scru-
tiny and found in favor of the Seventh Day Adventists. 4' The Smith
Court distinguished Sherbert by stating that the "good cause" re-
quirement of the benefits system involved in that case enabled the
decision-making body to make individualized determinations of eli-
gibility.42 Under such a system, the Court stated, "religious hard-
ship" could not be excluded as a form of good cause without com-
pelling justification. 43  Smith, meanwhile, involved a denial of
36. See id. at 888-89 (noting that use of the compelling interest test in this
context could bring religious exercise into conflict with child neglect laws, en-
vironmental protection laws, discrimination laws, and others).
37. See id. at 886-88.
38. Id. at 885.
39. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. See id. at 399-401.
41. See id. at 402-03, 410.
42. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
43. See id.
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benefits based on the violation of a generally applicable criminal
law, where no individualized determinations regarding the validity of
religious practices were involved. 44 According to the Court, this dis-
tinction was crucial to whether or not the strict scrutiny test should
be applied. 45 Yet, this explanation did not save the Court's reason-
ing, for the Court subsequently admitted applying the strict scrutiny
test in the past to criminal laws that were challenged on free exercise
grounds.46 The Court excused such past indiscretions, however, by
stating that it had at least "never applied the test to invalidate [such a
law]."47
It is noteworthy that much of the reasoning of Smith's lead
opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, was not supported by a substan-
tial number of the Court's members. Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall dissented,48 while Justice O'Connor concurred.49 Each
of these justices disagreed with the majority's refusal to apply the
strict scrutiny test in the free exercise context.50 They based this dis-
agreement primarily on a contrary reading of precedent, 5' with the
three dissenters compiling a sizable list of cases that seemed to read-
ily support their conclusion.
52
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 884-85 (admitting that in both United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982), and Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court ap-
plied the test in the free exercise context).
47. Id. at 885.
48. See id. at 907.
49. See id. at 891.
50. See id. at 891-903, 907-09.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 907 n.1 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
699 (1989) ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a
substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice
and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden");
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
(state laws burdening religions "must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could
be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest"); Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Our precedents have long required the Government to show that a
compelling state interest is served by its refusal to grant a religious exemp-
tion"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) ("The state may jus-
tify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accom-
plish an overriding governmental interest"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
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To the extent that the majority failed to adequately address these
precedential arguments, O'Connor and the three dissenters likewise
failed to adequately address the majority's more practical concerns
regarding the effects of using strict scrutiny in the free exercise con-
text. For example, in his opinion for the majority, Scalia discussed
how such a use of the strict scrutiny test would be equivalent to
"courting anarchy., 53 Specifically, the Justice feared the potential
scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, stating that in a so-
ciety as religiously diverse as ours, "we cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector,
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order.",54 Scalia then listed a number of laws that, he feared,
could have been successfully challenged under RFRA, such as tax
laws, environmental protection laws, animal cruelty laws, laws pro-
hibiting racial discrimination, and even manslaughter and child ne-
glect laws.55 In addition, Scalia pointed to the inappropriateness of
charging judges with the task of determining just what is "central" to
a given religion,5 6 as would be required if there were to be any limit
to RFRA's use. The Justice stated that "'[i]t is not within the judicial
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those
creeds."
57
O'Connor's concurrence responded to Scalia's concerns by
merely labeling them a "parade of horribles. ' '5 8 Yet, like Scalia's
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an in-
road on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest'); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215 (1972) ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not other-
wise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of relig-
ion"); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (question is "whether
some compelling state interest.., justifies the substantial infringement of ap-
pellant's First Amendment right") as support for the proposition that strict
scrutiny applies to all statutes that burden the free exercise of religion).
53. Id. at 888.
54. Id. (emphasis in original).
55. See id. at 888-89.
56. See id. at 886-87.
57. Id. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989)).
58. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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assertion that RFRA would create a "constitutional anomaly, 59
O'Connor failed to support her ultimate assertion that "courts have
been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to
strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state
interests., 60 The three dissenting Justices, meanwhile, did not even
respond to Scalia's concerns.6
One observation regarding the merits of the holding in Smith is
worth mentioning. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor lists a
number of cases cited by the majority and states that although the
constitutional claims in those cases were unsuccessful, the cases nev-
ertheless involved use of the strict scrutiny test to reach that result.
6 2
The cases cited involved "compelling" state interests in the form of
"regulating children's activities," an "interest in [a] uniform day of
rest," an "interest in military affairs," and an "interest in [a] compre-
hensive Social Security system ' 63 Also, although Justice O'Connor
applied the strict scrutiny test to the law challenged in Smith, she
nonetheless held the law invalid along with the majority.64
These facts point to a possible unspoken justification for the
majority's holding in Smith: Since, in the context of religious free-
dom claims against generally applicable laws, the Court has in the
past applied such a low threshold for establishing a compelling inter-
est, why have the requirement at all? In other words, perhaps the
majority of the Court simply realized, after perusing the free exercise
jurisprudence, that they had all along only been paying lip service to
this usually ultra-strict requirement. After all, for a test that has
adopted the reputation of being "'strict' in theory ... [yet] fatal in
fact," 65 it seems like a state would be getting off easy if it could jus-
tify its law with an interest in "regulating children's activities" or in
"a uniform day of rest." Compared to its use in other contexts, this
59. Id. at 886.
60. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 907-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 896-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 896 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961) (plurality opinion); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 258-59 (1982), respectively) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. See id. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.
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would be considered a low threshold indeed.66 If the Court is thus
prepared to reduce the strict scrutiny test to a mere moniker with no
real bite, it should be equally prepared, and equally justified, to dis-
miss the test altogether.
C. From Smith to RFRA
The Smith decision was met with a considerable amount of
scholarly criticism, much of which focused on the Court's apparent
disregard for what many believed to be the most sacred of rights
protected by the Constitution-namely, the free exercise of relig-
ion.67 One of the Court's strongest critics was Congress itself, which
responded to Smith with RFRA.65 In direct opposition to the Court's
holding in Smith, RFRA required both federal and state governments
to prove that "laws 'neutral' toward religion"69 are justified by a
compelling interest and are the least discriminatory means of
achieving that interest whenever those laws are shown to "substan-
tially burden" religious exercise.70
D. From RFRA to Boerne to State Religious Freedom Laws
Despite initial enthusiasm regarding RFRA's passage, fueled in
part by the embellishment of governmental oppression of religion
66. Compare the interests found to be compelling in the cases cited by
O'Connor to those found not to be sufficiently compelling in Palmore v. Si-
doti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (the best interests of a child in avoiding the societal
stigma caused by the interracial marriage of her parents), and Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (the reduction of alcohol-related traffic accidents). Al-
though these cases involve countervailing personal interests protected by the
Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, the difference in
state success rates in the two contexts highlights the lower threshold for "com-
pelling interests" in the latter.
67. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup.
Cr. REV. 1, 11; Kenneth Marin, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Su-
preme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
1431, 1431 (1991); Karin M. Rebescher, Note, The Illusory Enforcement of
First Amendment Freedom: Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith and the Abandonment of the Compelling Governmental Inter-
est Test, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1332, 1353 (1991).
68. See supra note 13.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (1994).
70. See id. § 2000bb(b).
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that was necessary to bring the passage about,7' the Act led a short
and not-so-glorious life. As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court
eventually struck down the Act less than four years after its passage.
Prior to that time, however, it was used in a number of contexts,
some seemingly appropriate and others somewhat less in keeping
with its originally exalted conception.72 Some examples of the laws
challenged under RFRA and the circumstances under which the
challenges were made include Hunt v. Hunt,73 where a father used
RFRA to remove himself from the obligation to pay child support;
Cheema v. Thompson,74 where school children, after a successful
RFRA challenge, were permitted to wear daggers to school for re-
ligious reasons; and United States v. Gonzales,75 where RFRA ex-
empted a Native American from prosecution under endangered spe-
cies laws for the killing of a bald eagle. In addition to these cases,
RFRA was also used extensively in the prison context.76 Of such
claims, only about ten percent were successful, 77 and successes usu-
ally involved such liberties as the ability of inmates to wear religious
symbols and to wear their hair at certain lengths.78
RFRA eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores.79 In that case, a Catholic Archbishop in Texas
used RFRA to challenge a local zoning ordinance that prohibited him
from enlarging his church.80 The Court dismissed the Archbishop's
claim and declared RFRA unconstitutional, stating that Congress, in
enacting the religious freedom law, had exceeded the scope of its en-
forcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.!'
71. See supra Part III.A.
72. For an extensive overview of the number and types of cases involving
RFRA challenges, see Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the
Court Was Right-Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 793, 802-08 (1998) (noting that, of the 168 cases involving such chal-
lenges, less than seven percent concluded with a grant of relief).
73. 648 A.2d 843 (Vt. 1994).
74. 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
75. 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997).
76. See Lupu, supra note 72, at 803.
77. See id. at 802-03.
78. See id. at 805.
79. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
80. See id. at 511-12.
81. See id. at 519-20.
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According to the Court, Section 5 gives Congress the power "to en-
force" the Fourteenth Amendment but "not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation,"8 2 which, as the Court
saw it, was exactly what RFRA was intended to do.83 In determining
that RFRA was in fact an attempt to expand the scope of rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment and not merely an "enforcement" or
"remedial" measure, the Court noted that the results achieved by the
Act were far out of proportion to the alleged harm that Congress had
intended it to remedy.84 In the exact words of the Court, the Act
failed to obtain the requisite "proportionality or congruence"8 5 be-
tween the harm and the remedy, and thus it represented an expansive
interpretation of the First Amendment by Congress. 86 Since inter-
preting the Constitution in order to determine its standards has tradi-
tionally been in the hands of the judiciary, the Supreme Court saw
RFRA as contradicting "vital principles necessary to maintain sepa-
ration of powers."8 7
In addition to finding a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine, the Court also intimated that RFRA violated principles of
federalism. Specifically, the Court stated that RFRA represented "a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional pre-
rogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare
of their citizens. ' 88 It was most likely language such as this that led
the California legislature, as well as the legislatures of other states, to
conclude that it was free to enact a religious freedom act of its own.
In fact, the official comments to the California bill quote its author as
stating, "[t]he [Boerne] decision left the door open to the states to of-
fer similar protections." 89
82. Id. at 519.
83. See id. at 520-21.
84. See id. at 532 (stating that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior").
85. Id. at 533.
86. See id. at 527-35.
87. Id. at 536.
88. Id. at 534.
89. Hearing on A.B. 1617, supra note 13, at 4.
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E. Prudential Concerns Revisited
Recall that in Smith, Justice Scalia denoted a number of laws
that might have come into conflict with the freedom of religious ex-
ercise should the strict scrutiny test be allowed in that context. Ac-
cording to Scalia, it would have been contrary to common sense to
allow exemptions from tax laws, child neglect laws, environmental
protection laws, etc., due to conflicts with a person's religious be-
liefs.90 Cases such as Hunt, Cheema, and Gonzales seem to fulfill
Scalia's prophecy as to RFRA's scope, since each of those cases was
successful.
This result brings into striking clarity the concerns raised at the
beginning of this Comment-that religious freedom legislation
would allow individuals to disregard laws that society as a whole has
determined to be in its best interests. When this occurs, those per-
sons whom Congress intended to protect through the now-
disregarded laws are the ones who will suffer. In Hunt, it was the
child whose father was excused from paying child support; in
Cheema, the children who attend public schools; in Gonzales, the
endangered and protected bald eagle. If these entities are to enjoy
the full protection of the law, and the enacted interests of the gov-
ernment to enjoy the weight of authority that they deserve, then re-
ligious freedom laws, whether passed by the federal government or
by the states, cannot stand.
In regard to this concern about the scope of religious freedom
legislation, one point is particularly distressing-a point, which in a
somewhat inverted fashion, may call for the overturning of Smith.
Specifically, there exists a disparity regarding the effectiveness of
making a religious freedom challenge to generally applicable laws
before and after RFRA's passage. Hunt, Cheema, and Gonzalez
were all successful. Yet, as the majority in Smith pointed out, even if
the strict scrutiny test was used in this context prior to that decision,
laws were very rarely invalidated under it.91 In fact, the majority
noted that the test was never used to invalidate a criminal law.
92
Even Justice O'Connor, who spent a number of pages discussing the
90. See supra Part II.B.
91. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884-85 (1990).
92. See id.
1196
HOLIER THAN THOU
appropriateness of using the strict scrutiny test against generally ap-
plicable laws, ultimately found that the religious rights of the two
Native American respondents were not infringed since the state had a
compelling interest in regulating the use of peyote.93
What this disparity suggests is that, in enacting RFRA, and
thereby giving an affirmative legislative right to disregard laws that
infringe upon religious practices, Congress increased both the fre-
quency of such challenges and their effectiveness. As noted above in
Part lIJ.B, prior to Smith, and thus prior to the enactment of RFRA,
assertions of free exercise rights against generally applicable laws
often failed to overcome even the most modest interests of the states.
During the life of RFRA, however, these claims gained strength.
Moreover, there is no reason to think that similar state laws will not
have the same degree of effectiveness, since federal precedent is the
most likely source of guidance in this brand new area of state juris-
prudence. Thus, for those who thought that the Court was correct in
ousting the strict scrutiny test from the free-exercise-versus-general-
laws context, it seems that the best alternative might be to overturn
Smith, and thus return to the more lenient standard used by the Court
before Smith.
IV. CHALLENGES
A. Where There's a Will There's a Way: The Court's Desire to
Strike Down Religious Freedom Laws
The language of the Supreme Court in both Smith and Boerne
indicate a desire to strike down even those religious freedom acts
that come from the states. In Boerne, despite its reliance on princi-
ples of separation of powers and federalism, the Court continued the
practice it began in Smith by giving significant weight to practical
considerations. For example, the Boerne Court at one point returned
to an argument made in the Smith case that contesting a claim that a
law substantially burdens one's religious exercise would be consid-
erably difficult. 94 Directly quoting Smith, the Court asked, "'What
principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a
93. See id. at 891-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35.
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believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his personal
faith?"' 95 So as not to reveal its disagreement with RFRA on the
merits, however, the Court quickly iterated that it "make[s] these ob-
servations not to reargue the position of the majority in Smith, 96 and
justified the observations as proof of RFRA's infringement on state
prerogative.
97
Other practical considerations the Court mentioned as counsel-
ing against the validity of RFRA include the "heavy litigation bur-
den" that it would cause 98 and the simple impracticality of the law in
our religiously diverse society.99 Once again echoing the concerns
voiced by Scalia in Smith, 100 the Boerne Court stated:
It is a reality of the modern regulatory state that numerous
state laws... impose a substantial burden on a large class
of individuals. When the exercise of religion has been bur-
dened in an incidental way by a law of general application,
it does not follow that the persons affected have been bur-
dened any more than other citizens, let alone burdened be-
cause of their religious beliefs.' 0'
Similarly, in Smith, a majority of the Court voiced a strong dis-
taste for use of the strict scrutiny test against generally applicable
laws in the context of religious freedom. 0 2 What the Smith majority
lacked in constitutional foundation, however, it made up for in sheer
determination, as evidenced by its weighty reliance on practical con-
cerns and equally weighty disregard of precedent1 3 -and where
there's a will, there's a way. Based upon Smith and upon Boerne's
undercurrents of continuing distaste for the strict scrutiny test in the
free exercise context, it is likely that the Supreme Court will use all
weapons in its arsenal to invalidate RFRA-like religious freedom
laws that come before it. The remainder of this Comment will focus
95. Id. at 534 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 887).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. See supra Part III.B.
101. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
102. See supra Part III.B.
103. See supra Part IILB.
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on those challenges to religious freedom acts that are most likely to
be successful if brought before the Supreme Court.
B. The Establishment Clause
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 0 4 the Supreme Court enunciated three
tests that a law must pass in order to avoid invalidation under the
Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.""
10 5
Even superficial analysis reveals that religious freedom acts such as
RFRA and California's Religious Freedom Protection Act violate all
three of the above tests. Unfortunately, the only Supreme Court Jus-
tice who appears to agree is Justice Stevens, who stated in his con-
currence in Boerne that the "governmental preference for religion, as
opposed to irreligion," that RFRA represents "is forbidden by the
First Amendment.'
0 6
Of course, Lemon itself is not without its problems. The Court
has used it sporadically since its pronouncement, and it has been met
with much scholarly criticism. 0 7 When the Court used it in a 1993
case, Justice Scalia objected to its use by describing it as a "ghoul in
a late-night horror movie"'0 8 and stating:
It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to
do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will
* ... When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we
invoke it... ; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids,
we ignore it entirely.'0 9
Yet, regardless of whether the Court has used the test sporadi-
cally in the past, the test remains "out there," ready to be utilized.
104. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
105. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
106. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107. See, e.g., Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon Is a
Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 12
BYUJ. PUB. L. 1 (1997).
108. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
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Furthermore, based on the Court's noted desire" 0 to use what weap-
ons it has against religious freedom legislation, the Lemon test seems
like a plausible, perhaps even likely, candidate. And if the Lemon
test were so used, the outcome would be clear: the religious freedom
legislation would not survive.
Consider, for example, the recently vetoed Religious Freedom
Protection Act of California. Under the first prong of the Lemon test,
a law must have a "secular legislative purpose." The California law
clearly does not. That law was admittedly enacted in response to
Smith and Boerne,"' and its unambiguous words, mimicking those
of Congress's RFRA, 112 inevitably lead to the conclusion that it was
meant to inhibit the government from hindering the exercise of re-
ligion. The California legislature itself admitted that its Religious
Freedom Protection Act had the "goal of strengthening the free exer-
cise of religion in California."'" 3 Surely, no less secular a purpose
can be imagined.
The second prong of the Lemon test prohibits laws that either
"advance or inhibit religion." The California law violates this prong
on grounds similar to those mentioned above. Even without the di-
rect admonition of the California legislature as to the purpose of its
own law, even a cursory reading of the law's unambiguous language
reveals that it would necessarily have the effect of "advancing" re-
ligion. The law places the decisions of the majority, as embodied in
a jurisdiction's legislative enactments, in a position inferior to the
free exercise claims of individuals. Not only does this further relig-
ion, but it does so at the expense of those interests and persons which
the majority has sought to protect through legislation."4
The third and final prong of the Lemon test requires that the
challenged law not foster an "excessive governmental entanglement
with religion." The California law violates this prong, as well. As
the Supreme Court voiced in both Smith and Boerne, use of strict
scrutiny in the free exercise context would place difficult decisions
110. See supra Part IV.A.
111. See Hearing on A.B. 1617, supra note 13, at 4.
112. Compare A.B. 1617, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) (each using similar language regarding Smith in the
statement of the law's purpose).
113. Hearing on A.B. 1617, supra note 13, at 1.
114. For a further discussion of this point; see supra Part III.E.
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regarding the religious significance of one's actions in the hands of
the judiciary." 5 Such a rule creates the potential that judges would
"entangle" themselves in debates over religious issues-issues that
have potentially been debated for centuries, remaining unresolved by
the world's foremost theologians. To expect the average judge to
possess the individualized expertise necessary to resolve such de-
bates not only defies reason, but under Lemon is contrary to the dic-
tates of the Establishment Clause. As stated by Chief Justice Burger
in Lemon, "state inspection and evaluation of the religious content of
a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement that
the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of
excessive government direction... of churches."
' 1 6
Further support for the conclusion that state religious freedom
legislation violates the Establishment Clause can be found in other
Supreme Court cases. In the 1994 case of Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,17 the Court stated that
"'[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of "neutrality" toward
religion,' . .. favoring neither one religion over others nor religious
adherents collectively over nonadherents.""8 Unless the Court had
secretly decided to overrule Kiryas Joel when it decided Boerne-
which it has given no indications of having intended-it would
appear that any law that allows religious adherents to exempt
themselves from generally applicable laws, while not allowing the
same for "non-believers," would violate the mandate of that case.
C. The Larson-Smith Paradox
Larson v. Valente 19 stands for the proposition that, under the
Establishment Clause, "one religious denomination cannot be offi-
cially preferred over another.' 20  In Larson, the Supreme Court
115. See supra Parts I.B and IIM.D.
116. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
117. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
118. Id. at 696 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973)) (emphasis added).
119. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
120. Id. at 244 (stating that this proposition is "[t]he clearest command of the
Establishment Clause").
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invalidated a provision of the Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act
that exempted from its registration and reporting requirements any
religious organization that received more than fifty percent of its
contributions from its own members or related organizations. 2, The
Court reasoned that religious equality, necessary for the Free Exer-
cise Clause to have any effect, required that every religious denomi-
nation "be equally at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs.
122
Since the Minnesota provision interfered with this equality, it was
presumptively invalid.
23
In addition to concluding that the Minnesota provision was in-
valid as granting a denominational preference to certain religions, the
Larson Court also stated that it violated the third prong of the Lemon
test (prohibiting excessive governmental entanglement of religion)
12 4
because it "'engender[ed] a risk of politicizing religion."",125 Ac-
cording to the Court, the "politicizing" occurred by virtue of the fact
that the provision was intended to advance, and had the necessary ef-
fect of advancing, some religions over others.'
26
Arguably, each of the reasons for which the Court invalidated
the denominational exemption in Larson applies with equal force to
RFRA-like religious freedom legislation. Like the Minnesota provi-
sion, RFRA and its progeny would have the effect of preferring cer-
tain religions over others, since at most only a few-but certainly not
all--religions could be granted exemptions in each suit brought un-
der these laws. Moreover, by virtue of this preference, the laws
would be violative of the third prong of the Lemon test, thus making
them doubly suspect.
The Court's decision in Larson, however, has important impli-
cations that go beyond its possible use to invalidate religious free-
dom legislation--implications raised by dicta from the Smith case.
In Smith, Justice Scalia stated that while use of the strict scrutiny test
against generally applicable laws would have been an inappropriate
means of ensuring the religious freedom of the Native Americans
121. See id. at 230-32, 255.
122. Id. at 245.
123. See id. at 246.
124. See supra Part IV.B.
125. Larson, 456 U.S. at 252 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
695 (1970)).
126. See id. at 253-55.
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involved in that case, Oregon could have protected this freedom by
way of a direct statutory exemption. 127 Yet, wouldn't this certainly
be a violation of Larson? The answer to this question implicates, al-
beit indirectly, the future success of challenges to religious freedom
laws-for if the answer is "yes," then Larson has essentially re-
moved the only means by which states can accommodate religious
adherents against restrictions imposed by generally applicable laws.
In the face of the societal criticism that would likely ensue once such
an across-the-board invalidation was realized, the Supreme Court
would be hard-pressed to justify its actions, which it may have a dif-
ficult time doing. If this were the case, then something-whether it
be the constitutional invalidity of state religious freedom legislation,
or the holding in Larson-would have to give.
V. CONCLUSION
In a society that cherishes diversity, and considers the fostering
of new ideas to be the bedrock of freedom, myriad and diverse re-
ligious denominations inevitably flourish. Such a society exists in
America, where the First Amendment to the Constitution both pro-
tects religious freedom and promotes religious diversity. 128 America,
however, is not just a nation of liberty and diversity. It is also a na-
tion of laws-laws created to protect the rights of its citizens.
Religious freedom legislation, which subjects to strict scrutiny
generally applicable laws that infringe upon religious liberty, has
brought this nation to a crossroads where diversity and the law com-
pete. While normally these competing interests can be reconciled,
religious freedom laws make such reconciliation impossible, for they
unjustifiably allow the complaints of religious adherents, however
spurious or unfounded, to trump the will of the majority.
Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court has taken a definite
side in this conflict. The Court's obvious disdain for the use of strict
scrutiny against generally applicable laws challenged under the Free
Exercise Clause is evident in both Smith and Boerne. Because of the
strength of this disdain, clear from the Court's repeated reference to
the practical concerns that the use of strict scrutiny in this context
127. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (stating that "a nondiscriminatory religious-
practice exemption... [would be] permitted").
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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would raise, the Court is likely to use whatever precedent it can
muster to invalidate any and all religious freedom laws that come be-
fore it.
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